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STUDIES ON BHARTÙHARI, 3: 
BHARTÙHARI ON SPHOÈA AND UNIVERSALS.1 
(published in: Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques 45.1 (1991), 5-18) 
 
 
1. It will soon be 40 years since John Brough’s influential article “Theories of 
general linguistics in the Sanskrit grammarians” appeared in print.2 Among the topics 
discussed is the spho†a. Brough complains that “this term spho†a, which is of prime 
importance for Indian linguistic theory, has unfortunately been subjected by modern 
writers to a great deal of unnecessary mystification” (p. 405). Two writers in particular 
are mentioned, A. Berriedale Keith and S. K. De. Keith has described the spho†a as “a 
mysterious entity, a sort of hypostatization of sound”, while De has used the expression 
“a somewhat mystical conception”. Brough concludes that “it is hardly to be wondered 
at if the western reader, in the face of numerous comparable accounts, should come to 
the conclusion that the spho†a-theory represents a departure from lucidity which, 
coming as it does from men whose professional task was the clear presentation of 
linguistic facts, is quite inexplicable” (p. 406). 
 For Brough the spho†a is “simply the linguistic sign in its aspect of meaning-
bearer (Bedeutungsträger)” (p. 406), or “simply the word considered as a single 
meaningful symbol” (p. 409). “In this conception of the spho†a,” Brough continues, “it 
seems to me that there is nothing ‘mysterious’: it is merely an abstraction to assist us in 
the handling of our linguistic material”. He concludes on p. 410: “It will thus be seen 
that the spho†a-doctrine, so far from being something ‘mysterious’, is in fact of central 
importance for the theory of language-symbolism.” 
 It may be that Brough’s observations are useful for general linguistics amd 
linguistic philosophy. Indeed, this is what Brough had in mind, for he wrote this article 
— as he put it — “not merely as a matter of antiquarian curiosity, but because in their 
extraordinary linguistic and philosophic acumen these ancient authors are still, I 
believe, worthy of our respect” (p. 402). But whether or not [6] similar ideas are, or 
should be, present in modern linguistics, this has nothing to do with the question 
                                                
1 Thanks are due to the Rockefeller Foundation which enabled me, for a period of one month, to direct 
my undivided attention to Bhart®hari's Våkyapad¥ya, in the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy. Studies on 
Bhart®hari 1 and 2 have appeared in Bulletin d'Études Indiennes 6 (1988), pp. 105-143, and Studien zur 
Indologie und Iranistik 15 (1989), pp. 101-117, respectively. 
2 Transactions of the Philological Society, 1951, pp. 27-46. Reprinted in A Reader on the Sanskrit 
Grammarians, edited by J. F. Staal, MIT Press, Cambridge — Massachussetts and London — England, 
1972, pp. 402-414. Page numbers refer to the reprint. 
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whether Brough’s observations help us to understand the ancient Indian grammarians 
— and among them Bhart®hari in particular. 
 Brough was aware that there may be more to the spho†a than is clear from his 
above-quoted remarks. He mentions in passing “the fact that the Indians themselves 
appear to have given ‘ontological status’ to this abstraction, and to have considered it as 
a sort of quasi-Kantian ‘Wort-an-sich’” (p. 409). On another page he mentions “the fact 
that on the basis of the spho†a-theory there was erected a metaphysical superstructure” 
(p. 411). Towards the end of the article (p. 412) he even quotes one of the few stanzas 
of the Våkyapad¥ya which make a statement about the ontological status of the spho†a; 
VP 1.96 (ed. Rau) says that ‘according to some’ the spho†a is a jåti ‘universal’.3 Brough 
rejects this view and claims that Bhart®hari’s spho†a was rather an individual. Nothing 
further is however said about the ‘metaphysical superstructure’. 
 We have to face the question whether we really understand Bhart®hari any better 
by knowing that one of his concepts correspond to a modern linguistic one, without 
knowing how it fits in his ‘metaphysical superstructure’. As long as the spho†a is not 
satisfactorily accounted for within the context of Bhart®hari’s theory, are we not correct 
as describing it as a ‘mysterious entity’, or as a ‘somewhat mystical conception’? 
 The main effect of Brough’s article is that it creates in us a sense of familiarity 
with respect to the spho†a, but familiarity is not the same as understanding. For 
example, Brough’s exposition may make us receptive to the idea that the sentence is an 
undivided entity (cf. p. 412 f.); but this does not help us to understand why, for 
Bhart®hari, also objects like pots are undivisible (VP 3.243). Nor can Brough’s 
arguments explain why the whole of the Rigveda is considered a unity by Bhart®hari 
(VP 3.553). 
 There can be no doubt that the transcultural assimilation of concepts can remove 
the feeling of strangeness, but this should not be confused with understanding. It may, 
on the contrary, in certain cases give rise to confusion. The comparison of Påˆini’s 
grammar with modern linguistics, for example, — besides contributing greatly to the 
general appreciation of Påˆini — has tended to overlook, or even misinterpret, certain 
aspects of this grammar. Brough’s stated aim to demystify the concept of spho†a, 
therefore, appears to be an attractive slogan rather than an achieved goal. 
 
2. The second publication I will consider is Bhart®hari and the Buddhists, An Essay 
in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought, by [7] Radhika 
Herzberger.4 Only a part of this book deals with Bhart®hari’s ideas, and only some 
aspects of this part will here be discussed. 
                                                
3 Brough translates 'class', but 'universal' seems more appropriate. 
4 Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster / Tokyo: D. Reidel. 1986. (Studies of Classical India, 8.) 
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 Herzberger complains about “the absence of an integrated portrait of Bhart®hari’s 
thought, a portrait that would convey the essential links between his grammatical ideas 
and his metaphysical ones” (p. 10). This shows that she attaches more value to 
Bhart®hari’s metaphysical ideas than Brough did. Yet she describes Brough’s above-
mentioned article as a first step in the direction of a demystification of Bhart®hari’s 
metaphysical ideas (id.). How does Herzberger do justice to these ideas? 
 The basic question to her approach is: “What is the basis on which names are 
given to things?” (p. xvii-xviii, xxi). The main ideas which she attributes to Bhart®hari 
in this context can be briefly described as follows: 
 Bhart®hari distinguishes two kinds of universals: thing-universals (arthajåti) and 
word-universals (ßabdajåti). From among these two, word universals are by far the most 
important; indeed “the status of the thing universals is ignored” (p. 37). Word-
universals — Herzberger calls them sometimes simply ‘universals’, as in the last line of 
p. 20 —, on the other hand, are “made up of three strands: a phonological strand, a 
syntactic strand and a semantic strand” (p. 21). The result is clear: “The speaker on the 
basis of the form of a word has immediate and unerring access to its meaning, its 
syntactic and phonological features” (p. 21). The semantic aspect of a word-universal 
makes the next step possible: word-universals participate in a hierarchical structure. 
“Thus the name ßiµßapå has access through its universal ßiµßapåtvam (sic!) to 
v®k∑atvam (sic!) (treeness) which is located in the name v®k∑a” (p. 33). This hierarchy 
can be extended upward. A ßiµßapå is a tree, and for that reason animate, etc. At the top 
of this hierarchy we find the Great Being, which is the Supreme Universal, and which is 
consequently designated by all words (p. 35-36). 
 In order to confront this scheme with the text of the Våkyapad¥ya, I lift out the 
following points: 
1) There are two kinds of universals: thing-universals and word-universals. 
2) Word-universals have a semantic aspect. 
3) Word-universals participate in a hierarchical structure. 
4) The top of this structure is constituted by the Great Being, which is the Supreme 
Universal. 
 
Let us now deal with these points one by one. 
[8] 
1) The first point is easily established, and obviously correct. VP 3.6 is thus translated 
by Herzberger (p. 29):5 
 
                                                
5 The reading accepted by Herzberger is (p. 28): svå jåti˙ prathama◊ ßabdai˙ sarvair evåbhidh¥yate / tato 
'rthajåtirËpe∑u tadadhyåropakalpanå // 
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All words first of all express their own universal; thereafter this universal (lit. it) is thought to be 
superimposed upon the forms of universals of [external] things. 
 
2) The second point is more problematic. The stanza which supposedly shows that 
word-universals have a semantic aspect, is VP 3.3: 
 
ke∑åµcit såhacaryeˆa jåti˙ ßaktyupalak∑aˆam / 
khadirådi∑v aßakte∑u ßakta˙ pratinidh¥yate // 
 
Herzberger translates (p. 20):6 
 
According to some, the universal indicates a capacity by way of accompaniment [of the 
individual]; when [a post made of ] khadira lacks the capacity [to perform the function enjoined 
by the injunction] something which has the capacity is substituted. 
 
She concludes: “There does not seem to be, in view of this stanza, any reason for 
denying that universals belonging in words lack semantic features.” 
 This conclusion shows — and the word ‘indicates’ in the translation suggested it 
already — that in Herzberger’s opinion this stanza is about word-universals. It isn’t, but 
it is easy to see how Herzberger arrived at this incorrect opinion. It is the result of her 
incorrect understanding of the preceding stanza VP 3.2. She translates it correctly (p. 
71):7 
 
In the artificial analysis of meanings / objects of words, a universal or an individual have been 
described as the two really eternal objects / meanings of all words. 
 
This stanza obviously concerns things. Yet Herzberger concludes from it that 
“Bhart®hari preferred the two-fold division of words into individuals (dravya) and 
universals (jåti)” (p. 71), as if a division of words rather than of meanings / objects of 
words were here under consideration. It is true that the preceding stanza VP 3.1 deals 
with the division of words, but Herzberger is clearly mistaken in thinking that 
“Bhart®hari had meant to subsume the former classification (of VP 3.1) within the latter, 
more embracing categories (of VP 3.2)” (p. 20). One does not subsume a classification 
of words within a classification of meanings / objects of words. 
[9] 
 In the translation of VP 3.3 we may replace the word ‘indicates’ with ‘co-
implies’, a term which renders the Sanskrit upalak∑aˆa at least as well, and makes very 
                                                
6 The translation of the same stanza on p. 75 is slightly different. 
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good sense. In the injunction “Tie up the beast to a post of khadira”, the word khadira 
refers to the universal of khadira wood and, by co-implication, to the capacity of 
khadira wood to perform its function. 
 
3) In order to substantiate the hierarchical structure of word universals, Herzberger 
adduces several stanzas. Consider first her translation of VP 3.7-8 (p. 31, 85; what 
follows is really an amalgamation based on these two translations):8 
 
Just as the essence (tattva), which is in the quality red, is designated in lacquer (ka∑åya) and, as a 
result of contact with the conjoint (saµyogisannikar∑a), is grasped even in garments; so also the 
universal, which is fixed in a word, as a result of the relation between word and object, brings 
about the effect of universals (jåtikårya), when universals belonging in things are designated. 
 
Herzberger makes much of the phrase ‘the effect of universals’ (jåtikårya) in the second 
of these two stanzas. “‘The effect of universals’,” she observes on p. 33, “derives from 
the hierarchical structure to which a universal located in a name has access. … Thus the 
name ßiµßapå has access through its universal, ßiµßapåtvam to v®k∑atvam (treeness) 
which is located in the name v®k∑a. The name, on the basis of its own universal, has 
negative access to the universal located in the name palåßa.” Later on the same page she 
sums up: “Thus ‘the effect of universals’ … represents a theory of the analytic and 
antonymic content of names.” 
 These statements do not, of course, constitute evidence for the correctness of their 
contents, and Herzberger is aware of it. The evidence, as she indicates on p. 33, follows 
these statements, and it seems clear that VP 3.10 is adduced to fulfil this role. This 
stanza has to be read in combination with the one that precedes it, and I reproduce both 
of them as found in Rau’s critical edition: 
 
VP 3.9: jåtißabdaikaße∑e så jåt¥nåµ jåtir i∑yate / 
  ßabdajåtaya ity atra tajjåti˙ ßabdajåti∑u // 
VP 3.10: yå ßabdajåtißabde∑u ßabdebhyo bhinnalak∑aˆå / 
  jåti˙ så ßabdajåtitvam avyatikramya vartate // 
 
The two stanzas deal with certain complications arising in connection with ekaße∑a — 
translated by Herzberger as ‘Remaindering of One’. An ordinary ex-[10]ample of 
ekaße∑a is v®k∑aß ca v®k∑aß ca v®k∑aß ca v®k∑å˙, which justifies the use of one single 
word v®k∑å˙ ‘trees’ to refer to three or more objects, with the help of a plural ending. 
                                                                                                                                         
7 VP 3.2: padårthånåm apoddhåre jåtir vå dravyam eva vå / padårthau sarvaßabdånå◊ nityåv 
evopavarˆitau // 
8 VP 3.7-8: yathå rakte guˆe tattva◊ ka∑åye vyapadißyate / sa◊yogisa◊nikar∑åc ca vastrådi∑v api 
g®hyate // tathå ßabdårthasa◊bandhåc chabde jåtir avasthitå / vyapadeße 'rthajåt¥nåm jåtikåryåya kalpate // 
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The discussion in the Mahåbhå∑ya shows that this is possible because words do not only 
refer to individuals, but also to universals.9 
 If now we wish to form the plural jåtaya˙ ‘universals’, we need the universal of 
the individuals referred to by the word jåti, i.e., the universal of universals. To justify 
the plural ßabdajåtaya˙ ‘word-universals’, similarly, we need the universal located in 
word-universals. However, no universals inhere in universals. How, then, is the 
formation of the plurals jåtaya˙ and ßabdajåtaya˙ to be explained? The answer is 
provided by VP 3.8 (see above), which stipulates that there where thing-universals (in 
the plural) are designated (vyapadeße ‘rthajåt¥nåm), the corresponding word-universal 
([ß]abde jåtir avasthitå) brings about the effect of universals (jåtikåryåya kalpate), i.e., 
justifies the plural. The role of the thing-universal — which in this particular case does 
not exist — is taken over by the word-universal. This is possible because of the link that 
unites words and things (ßabdårthasaµbandhå[t]), and therefore, indirectly, word-
universals and thing-universals. 
 This explanation is confirmed by VP 3.9-10, which can be translated as follows: 
 
In the case of ekaße∑a of the word jåti (i.e., in the formation of the plural jåtaya˙), we need that 
universal of universals (viz., the universal inhering in the word jåti). In the case of [the plural] 
ßabdajåtaya˙, the universal of that [word ßabdajåti] resides (in the manner indicated in stanzas 7-
8) in the word-universals (ßabdajåti). 
The universal which [inheres] in the words ßabdajåti [and makes the plural ßabdajåtaya˙ 
possible] is different from [those] words, [but] is nothing beyond a word-universal. 
 
In order to understand Herzberger’s interpretation of the stanza, we must know that she 
follows the reading found in Iyer’s non-critical edition, which deviates from Rau’s in 
the case of stanza 10. Iyer has here: 
 
yå ßabdajåti˙ ßabde∑u ßabdebhyo bhinnalak∑aˆå / 
jåtis så ßabdajåtitvam apy atikramya vartate // 
 
Herzberger tramslates the two stanzas as follows (p. 34, 90, cp. p. 93): 
 
It [i.e. the higher word universal] is held to be the universal of [lower, more specific] universals 
when [the operation] Remaindering of One is performed for words which signify universals as 
‘[these are] word universals here’; the higher word universal [lit. [11] it] is located in word 
universals. That word universal which is located in [all] words, [but] which is different from the 
words [in which it is located], resides there having even crossed over [its word universalness. 
 
                                                
9 Cf. Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 1.2.64 vt. 53 (ed. Kielhorn vol. I p. 246 l. 14-15: na hy åk®tipadårthikasya 
dravya◊ na padårtho dravyapadårthikasya våk®tir na padårtha˙ / ubhayor ubhaya◊ padårtha˙ / 
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Note that even this translation shouls leave no doubt that these stanzas concern the very 
special case of the plural of words which signify universals. It is hard to see how they 
could possibly be considered to justify a hierarchy of word-universals. We must assume 
that Herzberger drew some inspiration from the obscurity of stanza 10. 
 But we have already seen that this obscurity can be avoided by accepting the 
reading which is anyway to be preferred on the basis of Rau’s critical comparison of the 
Mss., and which gives a perfectly satisfactory meaning. Note that the reading accepted 
by Herzberger, and indeed her own translation, are still far removed from the ‘hierarchy 
of word-universals’, which can only be read into them with great effort. Indeed, 
Herzberger seems to be aware of this, for she introduces her explanatory remarks with 
the words: “I read this stanza in the following manner” (p. 34). She then continues: “A 
universal has the capacity to cross over both its own substratum as well as the phonetic 
features associated with it. Thus v®k∑atva loses its phonetic marks when it lodges in 
ßiµßapå. Íiµßapå has the sense of v®k∑a, but not its phonetic features.” A far-fetched 
interpretation indeed! 
 
4) VP 3.33 is quoted in order to show that "the hierarchy [of universals] reaches all the 
way up to the Supreme Universal, (mahåsåmånya), the Great Plenum, in which all 
words are properly fixed" (p. 35). Herzberger translates it as follows:10 
 
Divided into cows and so forth through distinctions present in those things which are its relata, 
[this] Being is called the [Supreme] Universal; and all words are fixed in this Universal. 
 
Again it is difficult to find support for Herzberger's point of view in this stanza. The 
only hint in that direction which I find in the translation is the word 'Supreme'. But this 
word is rightly put between hooks, for no word in the Sanskrit text corresponds to it; the 
addition of 'Supreme' is clearly an invention of the translator.11 
 I shall not here discuss the question in how far Herzberger's interpretation — 
which does not fit the text of the Våkyapad¥ya, as we have seen — represents [12] 
Helåråja's views. Herzberger herself expresses her 'surprise' at the discovery that 
Helåråja deviates from her interpretation at a crucial junction (p. 54). Nor does her 
interpretation of Bhart®hari find much support in her understanding of Dignåga, which 
— as she frankly admits on p. xxiii — "is shaped largely by my reading of 
                                                
10 VP 3.33: sambandhibhedåt sattaiva bhidyamånå gavådi∑u / jåtir ity ucyate tasyå◊ sarve ßabdå 
vyavasthitå˙ // 
11 Note that Brough, too, made a similar addition while translating this stanza; he has "the Class (par 
excellence)". See however below. 
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Bhart®hari".12 The conclusion is inevitable that Herzberger has not succeeded in her 
courageous attempt to elucidate Bhart®hari's ideas on the subject of universals. 
 
3. Both Brough and Herzberger worked from 'below' 'upward' in their attempt to 
understand Bhart®hari's thought. Brough never reaches the metaphysical 'superstructure', 
whose existence he none-the-less does not deny. For Herzberger the 'superstructure' is 
the 'top' of a construction built by her 'from below'. For Bhart®hari, however, we can be 
sure that the metaphysical superstructure did not come at the end, but rather at the 
beginning. It comes at the beginning literally, for the first stanzas of the Våkyapad¥ya 
speak of Brahman. But it must have come at the beginning in another sense as well: 
Bhart®hari wrote his work starting from a vision, in which the metaphysical aspects of 
his thought were already clearly represented. This at any rate seems an extremely 
reasonable assumption to make. 
 Let us therefore try to understand Bhart®hari's ideas — at least as far as they 
concern the spho†a and universals — 'from top to bottom'. We begin with a stanza 
discussed by both Brough and Herzberger, VP 3.33, which we shall study in its 
context:13 
 
From among the real and the unreal parts which are present in each thing, the real [part] is the 
universal, while the individuals are traditionally said to be unreal. (32) 
Being itself, when divided into cows etc. on account of the different things with which it is 
connected, is called 'universal'; all words are based on it. (33) 
They call it the meaning of the nominal stem and the meaning of the verbal root. It is eternal, it 
is the great åtman; [the abstract suffixes] tva, tal etc. refer to it. (34) 
[13] 
When it assumes sequence in individual cases, it is called 'activity'; when its sequential form is 
destroyed, it is called 'Being' (sattva). (35) 
It reaches the six states in the transformation of things, in order; on account of its own powers it 
appears like that. (36) 
Also sequence belongs to it. In it there is the experience of [the power called] 'time', divided as it 
were in earlier, later and so on. (37) 
It is the [posterior] non-existence of things, when we agree that they have disappeared; when the 
disappearance is in progress, it is known in the form 'it is being destroyed'. (38) 
                                                
12 See also p. 106: "Dignåga wrote against the assumed background of Bhart®hari's thought, and without 
an awareness of this background Dignåga's laconic statements remain obscure and odd." 
13 VP 3.32-39: satyåsatyau tu yau bhågau pratibhåva◊ vyavasthitau / satya◊ yat tatra så jåtir asatyå 
vyaktaya˙ sm®tå˙ // sa◊bandhibhedåt sattaiva bhidyamånå gavådi∑u / jåtir ity ucyate tasyå◊ sarve ßabdå 
vyavasthitå˙ // tå◊ pråtipadikårtha◊ ca dhåtvartha◊ ca pracak∑ate / så nityå så mahån åtmå tåm åhus 
tvatalådaya˙ // pråptakramå viße∑e∑u kriyå saivåbhidh¥yate / kramarËpasya sa◊håre tat sattvam iti 
kathyate // saiva bhåvavikåre∑u ∑a∂ avasthå˙ prapadyate / krameˆa ßaktibhi˙ svåbhir eva◊ 
pratyavabhåsate // åtmabhËta˙ kramo 'py asyå yatreda◊ kåladarßanam / paurvåparyådirËpeˆa 
pravibhaktam iva sthitam // tirobhåvåbhyupagame bhavana◊ saiva nåstitå / labdhakrame tirobhåve 
naßyat¥ti prat¥yate // pËrvasmåt pracyutå dharmåd apråptå cottara◊ padam / tadantaråle bhedånåm åßrayåj 
janma kathyate // 
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It is called 'birth' when it has left its earlier characteristic and has not [yet] reached its next 
position, because in the meantime it is the basis of different [forms of appearance]. (39) 
 
These stanzas undoubtedly describe Bhart®hari's absolute, which he sometimes calls 
'Brahman'. In the next article of the present series I intend to argue that this absolute is 
conceived of as a whole, as the totality of all there is, was, and will be. The present 
stanzas support this interpretation. Stanza 33, for example, speaks of Being which is 
divided into cows etc. The stanzas also refer to the 'powers' of Brahman, which play a 
role in producing the unreal world of our experience. Reality, on the other hand, only 
belongs to Brahman. 
 For further details of Bhart®hari's vision of the world I must refer to future articles 
in the present series. Here we must concentrate on universals. 
 Stanza 33 identifies Being — i.e., Brahman — and 'universal'. Does Bhart®hari 
have here some kind of 'supreme universal' in mind, as Brough and Herzberger 
maintain? Nothing in the stanza — nor indeed in any other stanza — suggests that. Nor 
is this interpretation in any way necessary. Consider stanza 32. It states that every 
object (bhåva) has a real and an unreal part. The real part is its universal. We may add 
that the real part of every object is Brahman. How? Stanza 33 explains it: it is Brahman 
as divided into cows etc. 
 We see that the division of Brahman must be visualized as consisting of two 
phases. There is the division of Brahman into universals. These universals are 
essentially identical with Brahman and do not contain any 'unreal' elements. 'Unreal' 
elements appear when a further division takes place under the influence of the 'powers' 
of Brahman. These powers introduce spatial and temporal divisions, among other 
things, and give rise to our 'unreal' phenomenal world. Stanza 35 strongly suggests that 
the introduction of sequence — the effect of time — is an important factor on the way 
from 'real' to 'unreal'. 
 The universals themselves contribute in the continuous creation of the 
phenomenal world:14 
[14] 
Nothing originates which has no universal; the universal urges the causes to manifest it. (25) 
The universals, entering both the eternal and the non-eternal causes, manifest themselves again 
and again in certain effects. (26) 
The universal is also effective in producing activity; it urges the activity to manifest the object in 
which it resides. (27) 
 
                                                
14 VP 3.25-27: na tad utpadyate ki◊cid yasya jåtir na vidyate / åtmåbhivyaktaye jåti˙ kåraˆånåm 
prayojikå // kåraˆe∑u pada◊ k®två nityånitye∑u jåtaya˙ / kvacit kårye∑v abhivyaktim upayånti puna˙ 
puna˙ // nirvartyamåna◊ yat karma jåtis tatråpi sådhanam / svåßrayasyåbhinißpattyai så kriyåyå˙ 
prayojikå // 
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The picture which thus evolves of universals is hardly that of an abstract entity different 
from the things in which it manifests itself, like the universals of the Vaiße∑ika 
philosophy. In an important way Bhart®hari's universal rather is the thing. It is not 
correct to think that there is a pot, and the universal potness which is different from it. 
Quite on the contrary, the pot in as far as it really exists is the universal; its not really 
existing shadow in the phenomenal world is the individual. It is therefore not possible to 
say that pot and potness are different, even though the former has a spatial and temporal 
dimension, which the latter has not. Universals, seen in this way, can most easily be 
compared with Plato's ideas: they are real and unchanging, while the things that figure 
in our experience are their unreal reflections. 
 Returning now to Bhart®hari's spho†a, if the real pot is the universal, the same 
must be true of words: the real word, i.e. the spho†a, is a universal. This is exactly the 
opinion attributed to 'some' in VP 1.96, the stanza so easily brushed aside by Brough:15 
 
Some consider that the spho†a is the universal revealed by the various individual instances, and 
they consider that the individuals belonging to this [universal] are the sounds. 
 
If we forget for a moment the attribution of this opinion to 'some', we see that we have 
arrived at a perfect understanding of the spho†a in the context of Bhart®hari's theory. To 
repeat the main points: like everything else, words too have two aspects, the real word 
and its phenomenal manifestations, which are not real. The phenomenal manifestation 
of the word is sound, the real word its universal, which is the essence of the word 
(ßabdatattva), identical with Brahman (VP 1.1). 
[15] 
 As in the case of the pot, it is not possible to say that spho†a and sound are 
different, even though the latter, unlike the former, has a spatial and a temporal 
dimension. This is exactly what is stated in VP 1.99:16 
 
And a connection with space etc. is also seen in the case of corporeal objects (such as pots); [in 
the same way] there is no difference between sound and word (i.e. spho†a), even though we 
distinguish different locations [in the case of sound].17 
 
The identical nature of spho†a and sound is illustrated with the help of the doctrine 
according to which the sense organ is of the same nature as the object it perceives:18 
                                                
15 VP 1.96: anekavyaktyabhivya∫gyå jåti˙ spho†a iti sm®tå / kaißcid vyaktaya evåsyå dhvanitvena 
prakalpitå˙ // 
16 VP 1.99: deßådhibhiß ca sa◊bandho d®∑†a˙ kåyavatåm api / deßabhedavikalpe 'pi na bhedo 
dhvanißabdayo˙ // 
17 This interpretation of the stanza differs from the one offered in the V®tti; see Appendix. 




Just as sense organs and their objects are suited to each other in a way which is fixed and does 
not change, in the same way spho†a and sound [are suited to each other] as manifested and 
manifestor. (100) 
In the world the cause which elucidates odour etc. — [which are objects] whose sense organs 
have the same nature [as themselves] — is fixed and determined for each substance. (101) 
 
According to this doctrine, the organ of smell is constituted of earth, of which smell is 
the characteristic property; the organ of sight is fire, which has colour as its 
characteristic property, and so on. The nature of the sense faculty and its object are 
therefore identical. 
 Why is the view of spho†a as universal attributed to 'some'? Does it mean that 
Bhart®hari himself did not accept this point of view? 
 The situation appears to be somewhat more complicated. In point of fact, 
Bhart®hari recognizes two possible views as to the thing denoted by words: it is the 
universal or the substance (dravya).19 In the Jåtisamuddeßa (VP 3.1-110) the point of 
departure is the view that words denote universals; in the following Dravyasamuddeßa 
(VP 3.111-128) words are taken to denote substance. Bhart®hari does not appear to 
make a choice between these two alternatives. 
[16] 
 Consider now the first two stanzas of the Dravyasamuddeßa:20 
 
'Self' (åtman), 'abiding essence' (vastu), 'own nature' (svabhåva), 'body' (ßar¥ra) and 'true 
principle' (tattva), these are synonyms of 'substance' (dravya); it is traditionally believed to be 
eternal. (111) 
The abiding essence (vastu), which is real, is known through its forms which are unreal. The real 
[abiding essence] is denoted by words which have unreal delimitations. (112) 
 
The content of the second of these two stanzas resembles to some extent VP 3.32-33, 
studied above. Here again we find that objects have a real and an unreal part. But in the 
case of the present stanza the real part is the substance, not the universal. Substance and 
universal are not the same thing for Bhart®hari. Bhart®hari rather deals, in these two 
sections of the third Kåˆ∂a of his Våkyapad¥ya, with the two views regarding the 
                                                                                                                                         
18 VP 1.100-101: grahaˆagråhyayo˙ siddhå yogyatå niyatå yathå / vya∫gyavyañjakabhåvena tathaiva 
spho†anådayo˙ // sad®ßagrahaˆånå◊ ca gandhåd¥nå◊ prakåßakam / nimitta◊ niyata◊ loke pratidravyam 
avasthitam // I prefer the reading -bhåvena in 100c to bhåve 'pi, which is slightly better supported by the 
Mss. 
19 See VP 3.2, quoted and translated above. Herzberger translates dravya with 'individual'; I prefer 
'substance'. 
20 VP 3.111-112: åtmå vastu svabhåvaß ca ßar¥ra◊ tattvam ity api / dravyam ity asya paryåyås tac ca 
nityam iti sm®tam / satya◊ vastu tadåkårair asatyair avadhåryate / asatyopådhibhi˙ ßabdai˙ satyam 
evåbhidh¥yate // 
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denotation of words, and shows that either way, whether one accepts the one or the 
other, all words denote Brahman. 
 Let us again return to the spho†a. Besides the view that the spho†a is a universal, 
we would, in view of the above, expect some stanzas in the first Kåˆ∂a which present 
the opinion of 'others' according to whom the spho†a is substance. 
 This is exactly what we find. The discussion of the spho†a as universal begins in 
VP 1.96 and extends up to 1.104. VP 1.105-110 and 120-121 (111-119 are really part of 
the V®tti)21 then present the alternative view; 1.105 reads:22 
 
Others declare that the spho†a is [the utterance] produced by the organs [of speech] on account 
of their contact and separation; the utterances born from [this initial] utterance are the sounds. 
 
The 'substantial' nature of the spho†a here described becomes especially clear in stanzas 
110 and 120:23 
 
Some accept that the real word is wind, [others] that it is atoms, [others again] that it is 
knowledge; for in debates the different points of view are endless. (110) The [real] word 
(whether it be wind, atoms or knowledge), though ceaselessly active, is not per-[17]ceived 
because of its subtle nature; it is noticed because of its cause, just as wind [is noticed] on 
account of a fan [which moves it ]. (120) 
 
We see that Bhart®hari, on the substantialist alternative, pictures sound as a superfine 
substance which is not noticed until certain causes specific to it have exerted their 
influence. This substance by itself does not undergo modifications; it is rather its 
'power' which does so when words are pronounced:24 
 
The power of the [word], which resides in the breath and in the mind, is differentiated when it 
manifests itself in the points of articulation. 
 
The timelessness of the spho†a can thus be maintained. 
 The enumeration of 'knowledge' (jñåna) in VP 1.110 might cause surprise; 
knowledge is not normally considered a substance. This depends however on one's 
point of view. For an idealist substance derives its reality from, is nothing but, 
                                                
21 See "Études sur Bhart®hari, 1. L'auteur et la date de la V®tti", section 4 (see note 1, above). 
22 VP 1.105: ya˙ sa◊yogavibhågåbhyå◊ karaˆair upajanyate / sa spho†a˙ ßabdajå˙ ßabdå dhvanayo 
'nyair udåh®tå˙ // 
23 VP 1.110, 120: våyor aˆËnå◊ jñånasya ßabdatvåpattir i∑yate / kaißcid darßanabhedo hi pravåde∑v 
anavasthita˙ // ajasrav®ttir ya˙ ßabda˙ sËk∑matvån nopalabhyate / vyajanåd våyur iva sa svanimittåt 
prat¥yate // 
24 VP 1.121: tasya pråˆe ca yå ßaktir yå ca buddhau vyavasthitå / vivartamånå sthåne∑u sai∑å bheda◊ 
prapadyate // 
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knowledge. And indeed, Bhart®hari himself, in his commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya, 
enumerates knowledge among a number of 'substances' which are all, ultimately, 
identical with Brahman:25 
 
'Because substance is eternal' (Mbh I p. 7 1. 11-12). The element earth is eternal. What is the 
true [part] in the element earth? The analytic imagination. What is the true [part] in the analytic 
imagination? Knowledge. What is the true [part] in knowledge? Om. And that is Brahman. 
 
Back to VP 1.110. Here, as so often, Bhart®hari declines to choose between the 
alternatives. It doesn't matter to him which substance constitutes the spho†a, as long as 
is clear that the view that the spho†a is a substance is shown to be tenable. As we have 
seen, it may also be a universal. Either way the duration of the spho†a is not affected by 
the duration of the perceived sound (cf. VP 1.106). 
 
 
Appendix: the authorship of the V®tti 
 
There are a number of reasons which have convinced me that the V®tti was not 
composed by the author of the stanzas of the Våkyapad¥ya; these have been presented in 
another publication.26 Here I propose to deal with one argument — [18] admittedly 
neither the most important nor strongest — which is directly related to the interpretation 
of VP 1.96-110, 120-121 presented in the last part of the present article. This 
interpretation deviates from the one given in the V®tti in some important details. I shall 
contrast the two interpretations, and show that the one given in the V®tti is more forced 
and artificial than its competitor. 
 The interpretation of the V®tti leads to difficulties under VP 1.99, translated 
above. Its last påda states that there is no difference between sound and word (na bhedo 
dhvanißabdayo˙); this at any rate would be its straightforward interpretation. This 
interpretation makes good sense in the context of spho†a conceived as a universal, for 
universals and individuals represent the same thing, be it from its real and its unreal 
side; see VP 3.32 translated above. 
 According to the V®tti, on the other hand, there is no denial of difference between 
sound and spho†a in this stanza, but denial of difference of location. And påda c 
(deßabhedavikalpe 'pi) — which we translated 'even though we distinguish different 
locations [in the case of sound]' — is, of necessity, interpreted in the V®tti as 'even 
                                                
25 Mahåbhå∑yad¥pikå of Bhart®hari, Fasc. IV, Ahnika I (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 1987) p. 
22 l. 19-21: dravya◊ hi nityam / nitya˙ p®thiv¥dhåtu˙ / p®thiv¥dhåtau ki◊ satyam / vikalpa˙ / vikalpe ki◊ 
satyam / jñånam / jñåne ki◊ satyam / o◊ / atha tad brahma / 
26 "Études sur Bhart®hari, 1. L'auteur et la date de la V®tti." (above, note 1.) 
BHARTÙHARI ON SPHOÈA AND UNIVERSALS   14 
 
 
though we wrongly distinguish different locations [for sound and spho†a]'.27 But this 
makes little sense, for the tendency is to confuse sound and spho†a, not to assign 
different locations to them. 
 Regarding the stanza as a whole, the V®tti feels obliged to consider it an answer to 
a rather absurd double objection. The first objection is:28 "The word is not manifested, 
because there is a difference of location [between it and that which manifests it]. For 
pots etc. are manifested by lamps etc. [only] when they are in the same location. But 
words are perceived at a location different from the conjunctions and disjunctions of the 
organs [of speech] which manifest them." The first objection loses its force if one 
assumes that rather the sounds manifest the word,29 so the V®tti raises its second 
objection:30 "How is a word, which is located in one single place, manifested by 
sounds which are located in several places, far removed [from the word]?" 
 The absurdity of this second objection — the only one that remains — follows 
from the fact, already stated above, that the tendency is to confuse sound and spho†a, 
not to assign different locations to them. 
 
 
                                                
27 Ed. Iyer p. 163 l. 2-3: … saty api deßabhedavikalpåbhimåne naivåsau tayor bhedo vidyata iti. 
28 Ed. Iyer p. 162 l. 3-5: deßabhedån nåbhivyajyate ßabda˙ / samånadeßasthå hi gha†ådaya˙ prad¥pådibhir 
vyajyante / karaˆasa◊yogavibhågåbhyå◊ tu vyañjakåbhyåm anyatra ßabdopalabdhir iti / 
29 Id. l. 5: sa cåya◊ dhvani∑u vyañjake∑v aprasa∫ga˙ / 
30 Id. l. 5-6: katham ekadeßastha˙ ßabdo nånådeßair ativiprak®∑†air dhvanibhir vyajyata iti / 
